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Social Rights as a Global Public Good:  





This study is undertaken to tackle the two critical frontlines of global governance for development 
aid: (i) translating human rights in the developmental context with the particular emphasis on social 
rights as a global public good; and (ii) introducing the accountability mechanism as a practical 
alternative to the organizational failure of legalist approaches. In dealing with the social construction 
of global governance, the study demonstrates mainly theoretical observations and normative 
foundations for advancing social rights as an alternative to blind faiths on the hard-core legalism, 
rather than empirical in-depth analyses. International society is characterized by the absence of world 
government and no centralized authorities to give sanctions against rule-breakers and also power 
relations among states. Power, however, is always legitimate only so long as it serves its original 
purposes, which, in the case of human rights, are the protection of rights and the pursuit of the public 
good. The manifest lesson from this study is that the new conceptualization of human rights by taking 
social rights as its soft substitute and the launching of accountability functions into international 
institutions are both socially constructed by the extended interactions of all parties involved in global 
governance. Accountability is at the center of institutional processes through which human rights is 
conceptually specified as a concrete form of social rights, and the implementation methods are 
reformulated from ideational legal measures to a realistic mechanism to hold agencies more 
accountable for their activities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
The idea of human rights in the terrain of development has attained near-celebrity status. 
In relatively short period of time, it has gone from the ranks of the unknown to a significant 
level of international awareness in practices, and it seems to acquire an officially essential 
status in international discourse on the rights-based approach (RBA) to development. 
Weighty international boards have been recurrently gathering to sanction the severe violation 
of human rights at every corner of the world and address the question of how to fulfil human 
rights as a universal task of human beings. Undoubtedly, the rhetoric of human rights 
becomes politicized as a normative universal idea which is more widely accepted today than 
it has ever been in the past. At least the language of national and international dialogues 
seems to reflect a shift in priorities and emphasis, taking into accounts the natural integrity of 
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human rights in the context of human development. The international society has been 
incessantly endeavouring to locate human rights at the centre of development-related 
agendas and spread them out by enacting international laws and mobilizing epistemic 
communities where academics and practitioners produce new paradigms of human rights 
under the changing external environments (Bull, 1985; Vincent, 1986). Indeed, human rights 
have become an integral element of the literature on development.  
Yet, this apparent victory of the human rights discourse always remains with some real 
suspicion and challenges against the depth and logical coherence of this positive approach. 
The scepticism pivots around the twin problems of human rights: the poverty of its cogent 
conceptualization; and the absence of centralized authorities for enforcing human rights at 
the global level. Firstly, the entire conceptual structure that underlies the oratory on human 
rights calls into question not only “whether we can coherently talk about rights without 
specifying whose duty it is to guarantee the fulfilment of the rights” but also whether the 
moral authority of human rights is conditional on the nature of acceptable ethics or it should 
be universal without considering contextual differentiations (Sen, 1999:228). Secondly, in 
the vicinity of enforcement institutions on human rights, the hard-core legalist approach 
arguing human rights as legal obligations rather than charity (Hamm, 2001; Higgins, 1984) 
adversely coexists with another hard-core legal pessimists holding “law of peoples as 
realistic utopia” (Rawls, 1999). Either conceptually or legally, the idea of human rights lacks 
the practicability of its applications in the real domain of international and social 
development.  
In response to these critiques, more conceptualistic labors to taper invisible distances 
between the utopia and realities are required as a prerequisite for identifying the hands-on 
intersection of human rights and development. The presence of well-argued practical 
concepts for human rights is a necessary condition to undertake a better implementation of 
RBA by minimizing inoperable utopian ideations and the dearth of its contextual 
applications. Its better implementation also ensues if there is a global accountability 
mechanism through which those who govern are held accountable to the governed at the 
global level. Accountability mechanisms, indeed, are not only an international legal 
institution with the specificity of binding punishments (as the legalist perspective) to some 
degree, but also a global governance apparatus aimed to reduce the possibilities of human 
rights abuse in aid relations (Kim, 2011).  
In this regard, this study sets out to address the mutual constitutionality of human rights 
and development via a social constructivist approach on the process-oriented basis. Avoiding 
a simple-minded analysis of the RBA to development by legalist approaches or utopian 
frames, such a process-based approach covers the social construction of developmental paths 
within which the notion of social rights is conceptually brought back as a global public good 
in the discussion of development aid, and the accountability mechanism is practically 
institutionalized as a ‘soft’ substitute for unworkable legal obligations among aid-related 
actors. In a nutshell, the intersection of human rights and development creates another 
joining of a conceptual translation of human rights as social rights and a practical device of 
the accountability mechanism to achieve social rights at the global level. For this 
constructivist point of view, this study proceeds in three steps: (i) a short review on the 
stunted manifestation of global governance for the RBA to development through the 
theoretical prisms of the English School (International Society); (ii) the construction of social 
rights as a conceptual platform to combine human rights and development in a functional 
fashion; (iii) the launching of accountability mechanisms which is taken to be foundational 




for sustaining social rights as a global public good.  
 
 
2. STUNTED GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FOR THE RBA IN INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY 
 
Development aid and its effectiveness cannot be positively evaluated without the 
betterment of people in need. The real promotion of peoples’ life betterment also requires the 
empowerment of people through participation and the endogenous development of economic 
growth. The RBA to development refers to a value-added approach that aims to achieve a 
positive transformation of power relations among the various development actors by blurring 
the distinction between human rights and development (Bellamy, 2003; Ibhawoh, 2011). 
This innovative idea considers not only strengthening the capacity of the duty-bearers who 
are obliged to fulfil the rights of the rights-holders, but also empowering the rights-holders 
who does not experience full rights for development.  
With regards to the global nature of RBA in aid relations, the realization of participatory 
development inevitably calls for global governance through which the RBA to development 
can be secured on institutional grounds beyond state sovereignties. Effective management of 
global governance, thereby, has been taken into consideration as an essential international 
regime organizing the global-local nexus for the protection of human rights as well as social 
development via people’s participation (Craig, 2010; Sinclair, 2012).1 It also becomes an 
effective policy prescription with which international development agencies tackle a growing 
array of globalized social problems in response to the deficiency of centralised enforcement 
mechanism in world politics (Deacon, 2007; Yeates, 2001). Thus, global governance can be 
recaptured as “governance without government” (Rosenau, 1992).  
The expansion of global concerns about the RBA to development has been rapidly and 
widely consolidated in the legal process of institutional authorities within intergovernmental 
organizations, particularly the United Nations over the last half century. The legal solutions 
have been a major apparatus for the human rights community to stretch out the importance of 
human rights as a universal value, rather than the simple replica of Eurocentric values in 
previous years (Uvin, 2004:17-19). Characteristically, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 under the excellent 
leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt, famously enshrined the full catalogue of human rights as 
the package of moral entitlement. This universal coverage of moral privilege, due to its little 
comfort to those who experience real-life violations of human rights, resulted in two 
additional covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which were 
both adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966. Altogether, the UDHR, ICCPR, and 
ICESCR are referred to as the International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR).2 While separating 
                                                          
1 International regime is often defined as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
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relations” (Krasner, 1983).  
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the rights into two Covenants contributes to the perception that the nature and value of 
human rights differ by category, the intent was to provide legal protections and support for 
the moral entitlements embodied in the UDHR. A series of UN world conferences in the first 
half of the 1990s helped to create and consolidate the consensus that democracy, human 
rights, sustainability, and social development are closely interdependent and self-reinforcing 
(Hamm, 2001:1007). The demand for linking human rights and development policy was put 
forward repeatedly at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the 1995 
World Conference on Women in Beijing and the 1995 World Summit for Social 
Development in Copenhagen. Aside from specific United Nations conventions, the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR) was authorized by a 1970 resolution of the 
UN Economic and Social Committee (UNECOSOC) to investigate reliable complaints about 
gross violations of human rights. The IBHR and UNHCR have contributed to providing legal 
foundations for a number of legal challenges against human rights violations henceforward at 
international forums and also lend weight to the legalistic argument that states are obliged by 
international human rights law and its enforcing mechanism – for example, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) – should be constituted as a core of global governance (Koh, 1999). 
However, such popularity of legalistic assertions in human rights community always 
encounters contrasting views embedded in the very fundamental challenge of no centralised 
world government which is supposedly authorized to make all states conform. There are 
influential thinkers such as Immanuel Kant who treat all rights as artifacts of state actions. 
This position would seem to imply that there are no human rights where there is no state to 
recognize them. Referrals of human rights violations to international bodies would violate 
the Westphalian model since they would constitute an external source of authority beyond 
national sovereignty (Booth, 1995). Jack Donnelly (2003) also confirms this sceptic of legal 
solutions by arguing that human rights exist because the international community has agreed 
that they are fundamentally important, and that governments can only enjoy legitimacy if 
they fulfil their human rights obligations. In addition, cultural critiques come to the fore of 
scepticism to legalistic solutions (Sen, 1999:228). Given that human rights should be viewed 
as being in the domain of social ethics, the moral authority of human rights is conditional on 
the nature of acceptable ethics which depend upon societal contexts prepossessing qualities 
or virtues of life and are hardly generalized as a particular set of universal values (Miller, 
2007). The absence of world government, therefore, marks the Achilles’ heel of global 
governance for the RBA to development.  
Under the circumstances of conflicting views between sovereign realism and the 
normative legality of human rights, the ‘English School’ or the ‘International Society’ school 
presents an alternative theoretical platform to envisage the human rights community as 
having constitutive power of international society in the terrain of human rights (Bull, 1977; 
Buzan, 2001). The English School is designed to overcome the realist limits by proposing 
that there is a ‘society of states’ at the international level, despite the condition of anarchy 
lacking a global ruler or world government. The theory of International Society firmly stands 
for the conviction that ideas and norms, rather than simply material capabilities, shape the 
conduct of international politics and generate a high possibility of transforming the generic 
contents of international system. It thus can be seen as a middle road between realism and 
liberalism (or cosmopolitanism) but also has independent contents that clearly distinguish the 
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English School from both positivism and reflectivism (Buzan, 2004).  
The first scholarly effort incorporating the theory of International Society into the issue 
of human rights comes from R. J. Vincent’s seminal volume Human Rights and International 
Relations (1986) in which he combines a cosmopolitan moral awareness with a keen 
opposite sense that political power is concentrated at the level of states. Realists’ disquiet 
about the capacity of sovereign states to enhance human rights is neutralized by the notion of 
international society contending that state legitimacy is no longer exclusively conditioned by 
a contract with other states but also by its adherence to a set of state-transcending human 
rights ideals, despite the undeniable fact that states retain most of their sovereign functions 
(Beitz, 2001; Levy and Sznaider, 2006). This notion would be perfectly consistent with 
international legal conceptions of sovereignty if the contending states had agreed to their 
jurisdiction as binding enforcements. In this vein, Stephen Krasner (1999) redefines state 
sovereignty as ‘organised hypocrisy’ which means that states have never been sovereign and 
rulers have been motivated by a desire to stay in power and violated frequently this 
longstanding norm of sovereignty for their won objectives. 
The English School’s another important observation on the global governance for RBA 
stems from its explanatory power of the expansion of international society (Bull, 1985). The 
expansion of modern states is an unavoidable and necessary condition for an international 
society in the sense that states from other cultures are bound to join the mainstream of 
international society because of the fact that the norms, rules and institutions of international 
society interact with the domestic life of polities rooted in different civilizations, thereby 
sustaining international norms under these circumstances (Hurrell, 2007; Jackson, 2000). The 
conception of international society theory presupposes that the potential scope of 
international society is somewhat wider, possibly embracing shared norms about such things 
as limitations on the use of force, and acceptable standards of civilization with regard to the 
relationship between states and citizens, such as human rights. Indeed, international society 
focuses on the possibility of shared moral norms underpinning a more expansive and 
interventionist understanding of international order beyond the Westphalian notion of state 
sovereignty. Such a convergence of nation states in the wake of the expansive international 
society can be recaptured by a sociological perspective of ‘institutional isomorphism’ which 
is referred to as a similarity of the processes or structure of one organisation to those of 
another, be it the result of imitation or independent development under similar constraints 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer et al., 1997; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Thus, any single 
superpower in world politics is not at ease able to reject the universalistic extension of 
human rights as a sort of public goods at the global level.  
Despite its theoretical visibility of constructing the global governance for human rights, 
the English School fails to avoid the stunted structuration of global governance, which 
results from the lack of centralized enforcement mechanisms and the relative ignorance of 
power struggle among states. It is a vital lesson from the English School’s theoretical 
interpretation to admit power relations surrounding international human rights institutions 
and develop practical approaches to the social construction of the universal norms for human 
rights (Ibhawoh, 2011; Evans, 2005). Without methodical investigations on alternative real-
world institutional mechanisms that impose political conditionality, rather than on unrealistic 
rigidities of legalistic solutions, it would be of no use to frame global governance as an 
effective dynamics integrating human rights in the context of development (Uvin and 
Biagiotti, 1996). More fundamentally, the following discussion is about whether the social 
construction of power and resistance on the intersection of human rights and development is 
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a civilizing or a corrupting force by differentiating the conceptualization of power (Barnett 
and Duvall, 2005). Such a social constructivist approach results in denying the longstanding 
nominal domination of natural rights over the principle of utility, which has been taken for 
granted throughout the historical development of human rights (Hunt, 2007). In doing so, the 
constructivist concept of human rights needs to be modified in a sophisticated manner in the 
specific form of social rights in order to enable willing states to engage with their own 
judicial contexts of human rights abuses and their articulation in cosmopolitan legal frames.  
 
 
3. SOCIAL RIGHTS AS A CONCEPTUAL PLATFORM FOR THE RBA 
 
Projecting human rights as a conceptual foundation for the RBA, without proper 
modifications, would cause the implementation problems of its practical applications to real 
grounds of the RBA to development. The comprehensive nature of human rights involves the 
pros and cons of its practical applicability. In a positive sense, human rights per se are an all-
encompassing universal provider of multiple aspects of human dignity, thereby stretching out 
the normative utility to cover any values related to the right to live of people in different sites. 
In a negative term, however, human rights are considered just a mixed bag of all possible 
general concerns about the RBA if they are conceived of as human values by overstretching 
the conceptual boundaries of human rights. Hence, it is a light task to manipulate them as 
one likes because they are exposed to the risk of arbitrary interpretations. The refurbishing 
project of the human rights (re)conceptualisation is necessarily undertaken to prevent the 
overtaxed use of human rights, foil the paradox of empty promises, and encourage the 
conceptual standardization and specific qualifications of human rights (Hafner-Burton and 
Tsutusi, 2005).   
The main idea of how to modify the wide-ranging concept of human rights is to scale 
down the conceptual purview from human rights to social rights which are regarded as a 
practical substitute for them. Social rights are advanced as a prime substance for the RBA 
beyond a minimum threshold of political and civil rights, and towards more advanced right 
to social equality which is based upon the societal entitlement of citizenships and universal 
social protection (Minkler, 2013; MacNaughton, 2013). More clarification of the human 
rights conception with the particular emphasis on social aspects of human rights contributes 
to not only making human rights more properly implemented with a specific set of 
accountability but also curtailing the overstretching risk of the RBA at random and 
preventing human rights from being degenerated as a political rhetoric. Social rights should 
be advanced as the final stage of modern citizenships where international society pursues the 
realization of human’s welfare by not only addressing universal values of rights but also 
admitting the existing power of states due to the fact that states are the effective actors who 
can secure social protection in reality.  
The introduction of social rights as a prime foundation of human rights draws a 
theoretical basis from the late British sociologist, T. H. Marshall (1964)’s systematic 
accounts for rights-based citizenships (see figure 1). Marshall’s class formulation of 
citizenship rights in the historical evolution of industrial society contains three elements in 
sequential processes: civil rights (18th century), political rights (19th century), and social 
rights (20th century). First form is the legal constitution of citizens as of equal standing in 
relation to the law; second is the access of all citizens to democratic apparatus for the 
exercise of political power over the state; and third is the provision of sufficient means for all  
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people to engage in full social participation. The coexistence of these civil, political, and 
social rights, which he argues amounted to the conditions necessary for full citizenship, is 
seen as the necessary precondition for their continued existence, and more clarifications on 
the concept of human rights. The realization of social rights, which can be recapped as the 
‘right to welfare’ (Marshall, 1971), is claimed as the final and fundamental goal of human 
rights organisations as well as development agencies, given that the development of human 
rights eventually is going to converge into social development based upon economic 
redistribution and freedom from poverty via social rights (Pogge, 2008). 
The notion that social development is indispensable for the realisation of human rights is 
already clearly stipulated in Article 28 of the UDHR from 1948: “everyone is entitled to a 
social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration 
can be fully realized.” UDHR’s Articles 22-26 also have come to be identified with social 
rights, because those articles cover entitlements to work, social security, education, and an 
adequate standard of living, which includes food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Further 
legal stipulations of social rights remained more specifically under the ICESCR (A 
Covenant) within which social rights are taken into account as a normative conceptualization 
to cover the other civil and political rights. From those UN-initiated covenants, it is 
confirmed that the relationship between human rights and development is beyond question in 
the sense that full commitments to social rights is not incompatible with general targets of 
international development communities such as poverty reduction, the ownership and 
empowerment of people, sustainable development, mutual accountability and so on. As a 
universal value, social rights enable every single individual to claim sufficient resources for a 
dignified life no matter what a country’s average income or income distribution might be 
(Minkler, 2013; Stiglitz et al., 2010). The idea of social rights in the domain of global human 
rights presents that the value of social rights should be greater than the simple sum of what 
individuals seek for the realization of economic or political betterments.3  
                                                          
3  Although good development and growth policies are necessary, they have not been remotely 
sufficient to reach those most in need. Researchers have concluded that neither current nor 
conceivable economic growth rates would be sufficient to achieve the Millennium Development 
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In a nutshell, a conceptualistic renovation of human rights takes place in light of the 
advancement of social rights as a conceptual platform for the RBA to development. Our 
tasks ahead to get this job done require two more commitments of the conceptual polishing 
and practical mechanisms to secure accountabilities of the RBA implementation.  
 
 
4. RECOGNIZING SOCIAL RIGHTS AS A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD 
 
The advent of neoliberal economic globalization threatens social rights to development. 
The protection from negative aftermaths of globalization entails a stronger consideration of 
human rights. The provision of social protection as an institutional and universal apparatus to 
realize social rights for sustainable development should be taken as a global public good by 
international society. The first rationale for this claim comes from the primary goods which 
social rights are able to supply, which contribute the betterment of welfare and the 
empowerment of people who receive them. The primary goods constitute the basic liberties 
and the basic obligations simultaneously: adequate standards of living, freedom from poverty, 
social protection, the social bases of self-respect, and mutual responsibilities. Secondly, all 
individuals across the world have the rights to access those goods on the equal basis and 
without competition to get more goods than others.  
More often than not, public goods have been discussed without specifying the geographic 
or jurisdictional reach of their benefits – local, national, regional or global. When it comes to 
international development and its relatedness to human rights, public goods need to have 
global benefits by creating commonality in a world of extreme disparities and poverty. 
Global public goods have been so far recognised as a critical mission which international aid 
agencies should provide. According to UNDP’s definition of global public goods, they are 
based upon microeconomic elements of public goods in the following manner. These are 
goods that benefit all but which are not particularly in the interests of any one person to make 
and sell or any one consumer to buy (Kaul et al., 2003). Strictly speaking, such goods are 
non-rivalrous and non-excludable in their consumption. If one person benefits from its 
provision, it does not stop another doing so. Universal coverage of social protection, in this 
regard, becomes a fundamental public good that peoples have the rights to access globally on 
the equal and no-competition conditions. Likewise but differently, the World Bank (2008), in 
its strategy for addressing global public goods, identifies five areas of global public goods for 
its engagement in a more concrete fashion. These include the environmental commons 
including the prevention of climate change and biodiversity, communicable diseases 
including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and avian influenza, international trade, international 
financial architecture, and global knowledge for development.  
All in all, goods moving beyond national territories have a special potential for being de 
facto public at the global level if they have non-excludable benefits, non-rival benefits or 
both. Global public goods are goods whose benefits extend to all countries, people and 
generations without discrimination of beneficiaries. With the nature of their fundamental 
publicness, social rights are reconsidered as a global public good to all citizens of the world 
as a whole. Every individual of international society has the right to ask social protection and 
freedom from poverty to his or her nation-state and the international community as well; in 
                                                          
Goals (MDGs) of halving even the lower global poverty rate of $ 1 per day or less from 1990 by 2015 
(World Bank, 2008).  




turn, international aid providers have the public obligation to supply such goods. Albert 
Hirschman (1970) aptly articulates, when people have no exit options – when they cannot 
refuse consumption – they cannot help but belong to the community of stakeholders. More 
often than not, the only strategy available to them is to seek a stronger voice and more direct 
participation in matters that affect their lives. Such ‘no exit’ situation is often the case for 
global public goods in the sense that individual actors normally opt for their direct 
engagement in the realization of social rights. The very critical issue with social rights as 
global public goods, therefore, is the extent to which some goods are global naturally and 
others have become global by policy choice of the public sector and participatory 
interventions of civil society. Also, the definition and range of public goods for social rights 
– whether they are confidentially limited or publicly open – are socially constructed by the 
increasing level of interdependence between civil society and public authorities at the both 
domestic and international levels. 
By borrowing the concept of the public sphere (Öffentlichkeit) from Jürgen Habermas 
(1989), the structural profile of social rights as a global public good is more visibly portrayed 
in terms of the aforementioned social construction processes. The storehouse of global public 
goods can be restated as a global public sphere where a public space occurs outside of the 
control by the state, and thereby individuals are able to exchange views and knowledge 
within this space (Hohendahl, 1999). In Habermas’s view, the essential characteristic of the 
public sphere culture is its critical nature embedded in its proactive movement removing 
‘representational’ culture where only one party is active and the other passive. Accordingly, 
an international entity, if it enables the public sphere culture for social rights to be cultivated 
by a dialogue as individuals either met in conversation or exchanged views via institutional 
channels, marks the gradual replacement of the existing one-sided conceptualization of 
human rights with a globalized public good of social rights. A deeper attention needs to be 
given to the recognition of an institutional set of accountability mechanisms as the globalized 
public sphere that can formulate and promote social rights as a global public good. 
 
 
5. ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINING SOCIAL RIGHTS: 
THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FRAMEWORK 
 
Along with the conceptual reformulation of human rights, another important task is how 
to sustain practical mechanisms to promote the implementation channels providing global 
public goods for the realization of the RBA to development. Strict legalist approaches have 
inherent limits on the issue of effective and accountable implementations to protect human 
rights, because they are unable to provide legally binding enforcements. The prevalence of 
voluntary agreements of member countries in intergovernmental organizations leads us to 
find an alternative way of ensuring the implementation and evaluation of development 
policies to meet some principles of social rights. To this end, this paper proposes the 
introduction and vitalization of the accountability mechanism within international aid 
organizations.  
The accountability mechanism is considered a central practical instrument which secures 
a formal or informal channel to prevent the violation of human rights by investigating the 
claims that people affected badly by aid conditionality bring to the accountability 
enforcement processes. Accountability refers to the notions that “some actors have the right 
to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their 
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responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that 
these responsibilities have not been met” (Grant and Keohane, 2005:29). In other words, 
decision-makers do not enjoy unlimited autonomy but have to justify their actions vis-à-vis 
affected parties or stakeholders (Held and Koenig-Archibugi, 2005). Affected parties are able 
to evaluate the actions and omission of rulers and to sanction them if their performance is 
severely poor by removing them from their positions of authority, primarily through the 
electoral processes. The successful presence of accountability requires institutional 
arrangements securing reliable information and communication between decision-makers 
and stakeholders as well as institutional capacity to impose penalties for poor performance. 
Therefore, the logic of accountability relations reflects a principal-agent view presenting 
rationalist mechanics in which the leading actor or principal sets goals and employs agents to 
accomplish them (Mulgan, 2003). The primary accountability mechanism lies in constraining 
the opportunistic behavior of representatives, and thereby principal’s authoritative sanctions 
lie at the heart of the accountability relationship.  
However, the enforcement mechanisms imposing sanctions for shortfalls in compliance 
are less likely to be effectively arranged in public institutions at the global level (Weber, 
1999). Instead of centralized enforcement, discussions of global accountability have centered 
on the ‘democratic deficits’ afflicting global governance in the sense that international 
organizations have too much secrecy within internal processes and much international 
organizational activity does not take place even in the shadow of democratic elections 
(Keohane and Nye, 2000; Caporaso, 2000; Nye, 2001). Accordingly, such a democratic 
question of global accountability generates three dimensions characterizing its distinctive 
path of interactions: (i) power does still matter inside international institutions; (ii) 
accountability gaps between normative ideas that international institutions create and actual 
practices that they project in reality undermine effective governance; and (iii) external actors 
are invited as counterparts who contribute to reducing the accountability deficit (Kim, 
2011:26).  
In fact, the accountability gaps resulting from discrepancies between a principal’s 
demands on an agent to report his or her activities and the agent’s response to it call for the 
institutionalization of mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation in order to fill in the gaps. 
The commonly espoused solution for the accountability deficit includes better oversight 
through tougher regulation, combined with harsh penalties as a deterrent. The magic wand of 
accountability is similarly seen to be at play in instances of global and local governance, 
where it is regarded as a supervening force able to promote democracy, justice, and greater 
human decency through the mechanisms of participation, transparency, benchmarked 
standards, and enforcement (Weisband and Ebrahim, 2007). Over the past decade, a large 
number of international aid organizations have begun to establish the accountability 
mechanisms within their internal structure of governance systems. Multilateral development 
banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank launched the Inspection Panel in 1993.4 Regional 
                                                          
4 The World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP) was established in September 1993 by the Board of 
Executive Directors of the World Bank to serve as an independent institution to improve the 
accountability deficits in Bank operations with respect to its policies and procedures (Shihata, 2000; 
Kim, 2011). The WBIP is an instrument for groups of two or more private citizens who believe that 
they or their interests have been or could be harmed by Bank-directed development projects to present 
their concerns through a Request for Inspection. It was an ambitious step towards the reform of 
accountability creating a more transparent environment for the agencies involved in Bank-financed 




development banks such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the African Development 
Bank (AFDB), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) established the 
Accountability Mechanism in the early 2000s.5 Other UN social agencies such as UNDP and 
UNICEF also have administered their international bureaus of investigation mechanisms 
respectively in order to enhance internal accountability inspecting the performance of 
officers and staffs. This paper focuses on the accountability mechanism of international 
society as a realistic solution to demonstrate how international actors are able to employ 
accountability mechanisms as an effective instrument to realize social rights as global public 
goods even in an indirect and implicit way.   
The notion of accountability is seen as a cornerstone of the social rights framework. Such 
an accountability-based framework for the protection of social rights is essentially a system 
of norms and practices that govern the relationship between the individual and the state or 
collective entities in political authority. Social rights standards, which meet the basic 
conditions of global public goods, set out the rights and freedoms to which all are entitled by 
virtue of being human, and the corresponding duties of those who excise authority or forms 
of power. Accountability from a human rights perspective refers to the relationship of 
government policymakers and other duty bearers to the rights holders affected by their 
decisions and actions. In so doing, accountability needs to be equipped with the three 
constituent elements for its theoretical operation in constructing and consolidating social 
rights as public goods at the global level: (i) responsibility; (ii) answerability; and (iii) 
enforceability (Schedler, 1999; Goetz and Jenkins, 2005:8; United Nations Human Rights, 
2013:10). First, responsibility refers to the requirement that those in positions of authority 
clearly define duties and performance standards, enabling their behaviour to be assessed 
transparently and objectively. Second, answerability requires public officials and institutions 
to provide reasons justifiable for their decisions to those affected by their actions, including 
the public at large, particularly voters who invest public officials with authority and legal 
mandates to provide oversight. The third element comes to the enforceability requiring 
public institutions to put mechanisms in place that monitor the degree to which public 
officials and institutions comply with established standards, impose sanctions on officials 
who do not comply, and ensure that appropriate corrective and remedial action are taken 
when necessarily required.  
In fact, the Paris Declaration of 2005 included ‘mutual accountability’ as one of the five 
principles for aid effectiveness at the 2nd High-Level Forum.6 This principle of accountability 
was re-emphasized by the Busan High-Level Forum in 2011 via the declaration of the Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. 7  Heading towards the Post-2015 
development agenda, international society has been struggling to enhance the practical value 
                                                          
activities to follow the policies and mandates of the institution. The role of the WBIP was especially 
important in its legitimacy to provide recommendations to the upper policy makers and empower the 
voices of affected people in recipient countries. In short, the WBIP provides a direct link between the 
Bank and the people who are likely to be affected by the projects it finances. 
5 For the case of ADB, refer to Asian Development Bank (2007).  
6 The Paris Declaration includes (i) ownership, (ii) alignment, (iii) harmonization, (iv) result-based 
management, and (v) mutual accountability.  
7 The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation includes (i) ownership of development 
priorities by developing countries, (ii) focus on results, (iii) inclusive development partnerships, and 
(iv) transparency and accountability to each other.  
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of accountability mechanisms in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)8 
and advancing the Post-2015 development agenda by hosting a series of international 
conferences, such as the High-Level Panel initiated by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-
Moon from 2012 to 2013. As a recent official record of accountability mechanisms, Mr Ban 
evidently stipulated the function of accountability for accelerating MDGs and implementing 
the Post-2015 development agenda on his report to the 68th UN General Assembly. The 
Article 75 of his report, “A Life of Dignity for All: Accelerating Progress towards the 
Millennium Development Goals and Advancing the United Nations Development Agenda 
beyond 2015,” mentions as follows (United Nations, 2013):      
 
“For such a sustainable development agenda to take root, four building blocks need to be 
agreed upon: (a) a far-reaching vision of the future firmly anchored in human rights and 
universally accepted values and principles, including those encapsulated in the Charter, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Millennium Declaration; (b) a set of concise 
goals and targets aimed at realizing the priorities of the agenda; (c) a global partnership for 
development to mobilize means of implementation; and (d) a participatory monitoring 
framework for tracking progress and mutual accountability mechanisms for all stakeholders.” 
(Italics added)  
 
We now know that the accountability mechanism is singled out as a necessary condition 
for the realization of human rights – more specifically, social rights – of all stakeholders 
involved in the humanitarian projects of MDGs as well as the Post-MDGs development 
agenda. Moreover, the accountability mechanism plays a significant role in narrowing down 
the dilemma gap between the hard-core legalist approach and the conceptual idealists by 
launching the soft institution of accountability mechanisms as an effective implementation 
engine minimizing the impractical strictness of unconditional legal reifications and 
simultaneously supporting the conceptualistic blindness of human rights idealists to some 
degree. It is worthwhile to note that the middle position of the accountability mechanism 
between the legal hard-core and the idealistic extremity creates operational benefits by 
providing the quasi-enforcement intervention into both opposite streams at the same time: 
while the accountability mechanism replaces the structural impediments of law-centered 
solutions with its flexible applications to internal and external transparencies and monitoring 
of international organizations, the softness of its legally-binding contributes to opening 
institutional spaces in which idealistic assertions of human social rights can be properly 
reconciled with realistic problems when being implemented.  
Such a remarkable contribution of accountability mechanisms albeit, there are, by and 
large, three further problematic points we need to think of more seriously. The primary task 
is on how principles of accountability, anchored in the international social rights framework, 
can be integrated within implementation mechanisms of the Post-MDGs agenda beyond 
                                                          
8 UN MDGs contain social development-related agendas: (i) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (ii) 
achieve universal primary education, (iii) promote gender equality and empower women, (iv) reduce 
child mortality, (v) improve maternal health, (vi) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, (vii) 
ensure environmental sustainability, and (viii) global partnership for development. Due to their 
characteristics limited to social development, international society has been eager to expand the 
purview of the Post-2015 development agenda by taking into account economic development, 
sustainable development, and peace and security, together with social development.  




2015. In particular, the principle of enforceability is the Achilles’ heel of the accountability 
mechanism, even though it holds a certain degree of sanction mechanisms against the 
misbehaviour of international aid agencies. Either World Bank’s Inspection Panel or other 
MDBs’ inspection facilities can provide official apparatuses to investigate negative impacts 
of agencies’ project performances on the people who feel themselves badly affected by those 
aid projects.9  Nevertheless, these inspection mechanisms are not perfectly equivalent to 
domestic courts of justice addressing the violation of agents and enforcing proper 
punishments against them. Secondly, the accountability mechanism based upon the social 
rights framework needs to entail its institutional sustainability. For this matter, the continuity 
of political leadership and institutional backup should be secured in order to endure an 
effective management of international organizations which are eager to sustain the protection 
of social rights beyond national sovereignty for the purpose of the utility of global public 
goods. Finally, the globalized definition and principles of social rights should be commonly 
shared by key member states; otherwise, they are presumably manipulated and arbitrated by 
different sets of state interests and strategies (Gibney, 2013). One of the most persistent 
accountability deficits in the current MDG framework has been the difficulty of holding 
advanced Western donor countries to account with regard to the commitments they have 
made to the global partnership for development. Once again, power politics can be brought 
back to the table of global governance as a critical factor. As Habermas aptly puts, the public 
sphere for engendering social rights as a global public good is more likely to be ruthlessly 
distorted by strong economic interferences and political manipulations to control it, if it is 
not suitably protected by legal measures and enforceable mechanisms. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 
 
This study is undertaken to tackle the two critical frontlines of global governance for 
development aid: (i) translating human rights in the developmental context with the 
particular emphasis on social rights as a global public good; and (ii) introducing the 
accountability mechanism as a practical alternative to the organizational failure of legalist 
approaches. In dealing with the social construction of global governance, the study 
demonstrates mainly theoretical observations and normative foundations for advancing social 
rights as an alternative to blind faiths on the hard-core legalism, rather than empirically in-
depth analyses. Fundamentally, these normative focal points for discussion are associated 
with the notion that international human rights have been an invented project by political 
authorities on the basis of power without accountability (Hunt, 2007; Whelan and Donnelly, 
2007; Kovach et al., 2003). As a logical response to them, the study works to set the record 
straight about the social construction of the RBA to development by the reconceptualization 
of human rights as social rights and the accountability mechanism as a necessary condition to 
make the constructivist process more transparent and sustainable.  
Indeed, the causal link between human rights and development boils down to the 
interconnection of power and accountability to regulate it. A conceptual and practical 
account of human rights in the domain of development needs to be clarified in order to 
answer the fundamental question of “how are we to decide when a person’s deprivation or 
                                                          
9 For more details on WBIP, refer to Kim (2011) and Shihata (2000). 
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suffering is bad enough to trigger remedial responsibilities in others, in particular if we are 
thinking about the question at a global level?” (Miller, 2007:163). We always keep in mind 
the absence of world government and no centralized authorities to give sanctions against 
rule-breakers and also power relations among states, whereas we need to develop the idea of 
global governance for development effectiveness and the realization of human rights. Power 
is always delegated for a reason, it is legitimate only so long as it serves its original purposes, 
which, in the case of human rights, are the protection of rights and the pursuit of the public 
good. The manifest lesson from our tasks is that the new conceptualization of human rights 
by taking social rights as its tangible substitute and the launching of accountability functions 
into international institutions are both socially constructed by the extended interactions of all 
parties involved in global governance. Accountability is at the center of institutional 
processes through which human rights are conceptually specified as a concrete form of social 
rights, and the implementation methods are reformulated from ideational legal measures to a 
realistic mechanism to hold agencies more accountable for their activities.  
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